Paul E. Weber v. State Delaware

On Motion for Reargument This 16th day of September, 1988, the Court has before it a motion for reargument by the State. The
motion contends that, because the terms of the kidnapping statute always require that there be restraint for a specific unlawful
purpose, the State will never be able to prove that the restraint was both for the purpose of and independent of the underlying
offense. In support of its position, the State also argues that Weber was not charged with restraining Long for the purpose
of assaulting her under subsection (4) of the kidnapping statute but was charged under subsection (5) with restraining her
for the purpose of terrorizing her. 10 The focus of the State's argument is upon the concept of restraint exclusively as
it relates to the alleged unlawful purpose for which the restraint was committed. Such an approach is too narrow because a
defendant may be charged with an underlying offense that is not the unlawful purpose for which the victim was being restrained. The kidnapping statute has two requirements. The first requirement is restraint. 11 Del.C. § § 783, 11
783A. The second requirement is that the restraint be for one of the unlawful purposes specifically enumerated in the statute.
Id. The Court's opinion in this case holds that "in every case when a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction
with an underlying crime, [not the underlying crime for which the restraint occurred] a specific instruction requiring the
jury to find that the movement and/or restraint is independent of and not incidental to the underlying crime [that is also
beng charged] is mandatory." ante, at ____. An underlying crime may be charged either as the result of the restraint used
to accomplish an unlawful purpose or as a result of the crime that constitutes the unlawful purpose for which the restraint
was initiated.