In re Estate of Joseph

Pursuant to section 6400 et seq. of the Probate Code, the estate of a deceased parent may pass by intestate succession to his child as heir. For these purposes, the code defines the relationship of parent and child to exist in three situations. First, section 6450, subdivision (a), provides that the ""relationship of parent and child exists between a person and the person's natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents."" Second, section 6450, subdivision (b), provides that the ""relationship of parent and child exists between an adopted person and the person's adopting parent or parents."" Third, section 6454 -- with which we are here concerned -- provides that the ""relationship of parent and child exists between [a] person and the person's foster parent or stepparent if"" ""(a) the relationship began during the person's minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the person's foster parent or stepparent,"" and ""(b) it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier."" Thus, this provision contains what may be called a ""continuing relationship"" requirement: the relationship must have continued from minority until death. It also contains what may be called a ""legal barrier"" requirement: a legal barrier must have been the necessary cause of the failure to adopt. We granted review in this proceeding in order to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal respecting the meaning of Probate Code section 6454. In Estate of Stevenson (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 852 (hereafter sometimes Stevenson), the Sixth Appellate District held, in substance, that what would become section 6454 allows the legal barrier or barriers to adoption of the foster child or stepchild by the foster parent or stepparent to have existed only at a time at which adoption was contemplated or attempted. In Estate of Cleveland (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 1700 (hereafter sometimes Cleveland), Division Five of the Second Appellate District, declining to follow Stevenson, held, in substance, that what would become the provision requires that the legal barrier or barriers to adoption must have continued until death. As we shall explain, we conclude that the Cleveland court was right and the Stevenson court was wrong.