Alexander's Last Days: Malaria and Mind Games‪?‬

By the time Alexander fell ill in Babylon before the end of May 323, there can have been few among his officers and men who had any real interest in his continued existence. He had lost face when his troops forced him to abandon his plan to advance from the river Beas (Hyphasis) to the Ganges, (1) and from that point the odds on his succeeding at every challenge were lengthening. The march through the Gedrosian desert was a disaster, as supplies ran out, and Plutarch reports that some 75% of those with Alexander perished (Alex. 66.4), though despite Plutarch's phraseology this may refer principally to camp-followers. Alexander then launched a purge of those who could share the blame for failing to get adequate supplies to the army, and a purge of satrapal and army officers whom he could accuse of disloyalty or incompetence. When Alexander reached Susa in March/April 324 the Macedonian troops felt seriously threatened by the arrival of the thirty thousand Epigonoi, young Asians who had been conscripted and forced to undergo military training in the Macedonian manner. (2) Macedonian resentment intensified when Alexander announced that he was going to send back to Macedonia the large number of troops whom he considered no longer fit for active service. Their response was that they should all be demobilised and sent home. What waited for all who remained with Alexander was a new phase in the war, with an invasion of 'Arabia', which may have meant in the first instance Oman. (3) Beyond that it is not certain what he had in mind, but a campaign along the North African coast as far as Carthage, and perhaps even the Pillars of Hercules, seems to have been promised. Certainly two fleets were being built up, one to operate in the Mediterranean, and the other to back up the invasion of Arabian territory. (4) The insecurity felt by the Macedonian troops would have intensified when in 323 Peucestas arrived in Babylon with a further twenty thousand Persian troops, who were integrated into the battalions of the Companion Infantry. These were now constituted in platoons of sixteen, of whom four would be Macedonian 'NCOs' (A. 7.23.3-4). Apart from any operational advantage, this major reform was a way of countering the growing solidarity among the Macedonian common soldiers. He needed to promote a code of honour that set competitive values above cooperative, while at the same time trying to create an integrated multi-ethnic army. (5) He was not winning: his Macedonian troops, and probably his Greek troops too, had grievances about their conditions of service, were alarmed by the progressive orientalising of the army, court and administration, and had reason to be apprehensive about his ambitions, which were not only for fresh conquests but also for recognition of his divine nature. He died in the late afternoon or early evening of 11 June 323. (6) The key source used by Plutarch and Arrian, known as The Ephemerides (Royal Journal), recorded two days of heavy drinking, (7) followed by eleven days of sickness before death. Plutarch and Arrian clearly believed this source to be genuine and authoritative, even though it is not cited for any other military or political event in the history of Alexander's campaigns. Diodorus Siculus and Curtius Rufus, both probably following Cleitarchus, have little of substance to add, but support the tradition that the official line was that Alexander died from some sickness. The versions of the Ephemerides offered by Plutarch and Arrian do not cohere too well, and may derive from different sources or editions. (8) A rationalised summary is offered in the following Appendix.