![Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, And Corporate Culture.](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
![Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, And Corporate Culture.](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
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Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, And Corporate Culture.
Virginia Tax Review 2007, Spring, 26, 4
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Publisher Description
This Essay examines the problem of tax noncompliance through the prism of the options backdating scandal. The noncompliance of backdating was obvious, at least to tax lawyers. Backdating wasn't a sophisticated tax scheme. Rather, the noncompliance was collateral damage from weak internal controls and, in some cases, the rent-seeking of executives. Noncompliance in the face of clear rules is an overlooked problem in the corporate tax shelter literature, which tends to focus on disclosure, deterrence, or statutory interpretation. We should also study what creates the demand for tax shelters. The evidence from backdating suggests that a fast-and-loose attitude can develop when innovative companies outgrow their internal controls. When viewed in institutional context, this subset of corporate tax shelters, although adorned with more formal attire than backdating, may also be best understood as a compliance issue rather than a problem of textualism or inadequate penalties.