On Motion For Rehearing We believe that our original disposition of this case was correct. Furthermore, as an additional reason for sustaining the judgment, we have concluded, upon a further consideration, that the description in the written agreement is insufficient, as a matter of law, to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. The only description of the real property contained therein is ""all of the real estate used with Strawn Concrete Pipe and Tile."" It is not shown by the agreement that Seaboalt is the owner of the property. It is true he executed the agreement as ""Owner, Strawn Concrete Pipe and Tile"" but it is nowhere shown that Strawn Concrete Pipe and Tile owns the property but merely states that it uses the property. The ownership is left to conjecture. Where the identity of the property is doubtful, ownership becomes an important element. The fact that Seaboalt signed the agreement and agreed to sell it does not necessarily raise an inference that he owned the property. Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150; Starkey et al. v. Texas Farm Mortgage Company, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 999, Writ Ref. No city, county or state is mentioned in connection with the location of the property. No lot or block number is given, nor is there any indication as to the amount of land sold. The essential elements of the contract may never be supplied by parol. Parol evidence must not constitute the framework or skeleton of the agreement. This must be contained in the writing. Extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of identifying the land from data given in the contract but it is not proper for the purpose of supplying the location or description. The description in the agreement is vague, indefinite and uncertain and does not sufficiently identify the real property, nor is there any reference therein to any instrument of writing by which such property can be identified. O'Harin v. Neal et ux., Tex.Civ.App., 56 S.W.2d 1105, Writ Ref.; Rosen v. Phelps, Tex.Civ.App., 160 S.W. 104, Writ Ref.; Penn v. Texas Yellow Pine Lumber Co., 35 Tex.Civ.App. 181, 79 S.W. 842, Writ Ref.; Sneed v. Lester, Tex.Civ.App., 76 S.W.2d 802, Writ Ref.; Osborne v. Moore, 112 Tex. 361, 247 S.W. 498; Matney v. Odom, 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W.2d 980; Greer v. Greer, 144 Tex. 528, 191 S.W.2d 848; Pickett et ux. v. Bishop, Tex.Sup., 223 S.W.2d 222.