Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp‪.‬

Plaintiff Standard Microsystems Corporation brought this action accusing a Taiwanese corporation and an Israeli corporation of misappropriating the design of a microchip used in manufacturing personal computers. Both defendants were advised by their California attorney that the attempt to serve them by mail was ineffective, and that they were under no obligation to answer the complaint. When plaintiff took their default, the same attorney sought relief on the ground that service was void, or that defendants themselves were guilty of mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in believing it to be void. The trial court found that the defaults were the result of a calculated strategy resting on a mistake of law, which did not constitute excusable neglect. It denied relief and entered a default judgment. Defendants then engaged new counsel, who moved for relief from the default judgment, as well as the underlying default, on the ground that both were the results of the fault of defendants? first attorney-an assertion that, if borne out, would ordinarily entitle them to mandatory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) ( 473(b).). The trial court again denied relief. We hold that this was error because the undisputed facts plainly established the attorney fault necessary to trigger a right to mandatory relief. We also reject plaintiff?s argument that relief was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 ( 1008), which restricts motions for reconsideration and renewals of previously denied motions. Although the later motion may have been, in part, a renewal of the first motion within the terms of section 1008, the relief that made it so was ancillary to, and necessary to effectuate, the greater object of the second motion, which neither sought reconsideration nor the issuance of an order the court had previously declined to grant. Further, to the extent a literal application of section 1008 might conflict with the provisions of section 473(b), the latter must prevail. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment.