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Surplus Embryos, Nonreproductive Cloning, And the Intend/Foresee Distinction.
The Hastings Center Report 2003, May-June, 33, 3
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Publisher Description
One interesting view to emerge from the stem cell debate is that while it is sometimes permissible to use human embryos for stem cell derivation, it is wrong to create them just for this purpose. Public figures such as Senator Bill Frist and Dr. Charles Krauthammer have endorsed this view in calling for a ban on cloning-for-biomedical-research while at the same time accepting both the practice that gives rise to surplus embryos in U.S. fertility clinics, and the use of those surplus embryos for medical research or therapy. They reject cloning-for-biomedical research because, unlike the other practices, it involves creating embryos with the intention of destroying them for medical use. This, they believe, exploits embryos in a way that the other practices do not. (1) Some, however, have attacked this hybrid position on the grounds that if concerns about exploitation arise for cloning-for-biomedical-research, then the very same concerns arise equally for the other practices. (2) Michael Sandel (who serves with Krauthammer on the President's Council on Bioethics) asks: "If the creation and sacrifice of spare embryos in infertility treatment is morally acceptable, why isn't the creation and sacrifice of embryos for stem cell research also acceptable? After all, both practices serve worthy ends, and curing diseases like Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, and diabetes is at least as important as enabling infertile couples to have genetically related children." (3) He goes on to suggest that there is no difference with respect to the implicit attitude toward embryos: