The Accidental Guerrilla
fighting small wars in the midst of a big one
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- $16.99
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- $16.99
Publisher Description
In the first few years of the post-9/11 era, the established models for fighting ‘small wars’ proved distressingly ineffective against resilient insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the insurgents fought Western armies to a stalemate, it was clear that a new approach was necessary. David Kilcullen, a former Australian army officer, and one of the world’s most influential experts on guerrilla warfare, became a key architect of the West’s revamped military strategy. As the senior advisor to General David Patraeus in Iraq, Kilcullen’s revolutionary approach to counterinsurgency was an intellectual foundation for ‘the Surge’ of 2007.
In The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen takes us on the ground to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the global challenge (the ‘War on Terrorism’) and small wars across the world in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Thailand, East Timor, and Pakistan. He explains that today’s conflicts are a complex hybrid of contrasting trends that America has tended to conflate, blurring the distinction between local and global struggles, and thereby enormously complicating our challenges. The West has continually misidentified insurgents with limited aims and legitimate grievances—‘accidental guerrillas’—as members of a unified worldwide terror network. We must learn how to disentangle these strands, develop strategies that deal with global threats, avoid local conflicts where possible, and win them where necessary.
Coloured with gripping battlefield experiences that range from the jungles and highlands of South-East Asia and the mountains of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the dusty towns of the Middle East, The Accidental Guerrilla will, quite simply, change the way we think about war.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Kilcullen, adviser on counterinsurgency to General Petraeus, defines "accidental guerrillas" as locals fighting primarily because outsiders (often Westerners) are intruding into their physical and cultural space, but they may also be galvanized by high-tech, internationally oriented ideologues. This interaction of two kinds of nonstate opponents renders both traditional counterterrorism and counterinsurgency inadequate. Kilcullen uses Afghanistan and Iraq as primary case studies for a new kind of war that relies on an ability to provoke Western powers into protracted, exhausting, expensive interventions. Kilcullen presents two possible responses. Strategic disruption keeps existing terrorists off balance. Military assistance attacks the conditions producing "accidental guerrillas." That may mean full-spectrum assistance, involving an entire society. Moving beyond a simplistic "war on terror" depends on rebalancing military and nonmilitary elements of power. It calls for a long view, a measured approach and a need to distinguish among various enemies. It requires limiting the role of government agencies in favor of an indirect approach emphasizing local interests and local relationships. Not least, Kilcullen says, breaking the terrorist cycle requires establishing patterns of "virtue, moral authority, and credibility" in the larger society. Kilcullen's compelling argument merits wide attention.