Changes in the Organization of the Norwegian Fishing Industry (Thalassorama‪)‬

The fishing industry in many countries, particularly the harvesting sector, is often located at the periphery of the national economy. Incomes are low and workers in the industry often do not have access to any social benefits. This fishing industry also has little political power. One exception to this picture of a marginal industry is the Norwegian fishing industry. The income levels of people in the fisheries are not much lower than the national average. The safety net of the Norwegian welfare state extends to the fishermen. In contrast to most other countries, the Norwegian fishery sector is well-organized politically. Until recently, sector politics have been dominated by a single organization, the Fishermen's Association. The organizational and political coherence of the fishing sector has resulted in an impressive ability to mobilize politically. One example is the 1964 Main Agreement in which the government accepted responsibility for keeping fishermen's incomes at a reasonable level. Another example is the sector's role in the question of Norwegian membership in the European Community. It is generally recognized that a deciding factor behind the negative vote in the 1972 referendum over Norwegian EEC membership was the fierce resistance from fishermen (Holm, 1993). In the 1994 referendum, the fishery was again the single most important factor leading to the Norwegian rejection of European Union membership. Compared to the general picture of the fisheries as crisis-ridden and underdeveloped, the Norwegian fishery sector is prosperous, powerful, and prestigious. How can this be explained? The full answer to this question would require a comparative study, and cannot be given here. Instead, we focus on one characteristic of Norwegian fisheries: its highly developed system of corporatist arrangements. Our suggestion is that the relative wealth and influence of the Norwegian fishery sector can be explained by its system of sector organization. This system is now undergoing reform. We analyze the role the institutional arrangements have played in the past in giving power to the fishery sector. As we show below, the basic corporatist institutions of the fishing sector and the ties among them have been weakened. Instead, a new sector system, more in line with pluralist principles, is under construction. What are the consequences of this reform? If the relative prosperity and political influence of the fishery sector have been due to the specific corporatist arrangements of the sector, the fishermen have reasons to be concerned about the current reforms. What are the basic traits of the new institutional system? Around what values is it constructed? Whose interests will it protect?