Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool: Implications of the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for Itqs in Fisheries (Report)
Marine Resource Economics 2007, Dec, 22, 4
-
- $5.99
-
- $5.99
Publisher Description
Introduction On-going efforts to mitigate the losses of the commons in various environmental and natural resource settings have brought renewed consideration of the use of property rights arrangements. (1) These include individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries, tradable emission permits in air pollution control, and exchangeable development permits in land use planning (Tietenberg 2007, 63). While attractive because of their ability to better link private and social net benefits in decision making than is possible with traditional command-and-control regulation, property rights instruments face complicated institutional design and implementation problems.
More Books Like This
Stranded Capital in Fisheries: The Pacific Coast Groundfish/Whiting Case (Report)
2009
Advances in Property Rights Based Fisheries Management: An Introduction.
2007
Ownership of Renewable Ocean Resources.
1994
Species at Risk
2010
Alternative Arrangements for Marine Fisheries
2015
Rethinking the Federal Lands
2015
More Books by Marine Resource Economics
Wealth-Based Fisheries Management: Using Fisheries Wealth to Orchestrate Sound Fisheries Policy in Practice (Perspectives) (Report)
2009
An Evaluation of Sustainable Seafood Guides: Implications for Environmental Groups and the Seafood Industry (Thalassorama) (Report)
2009
International Benefit Transfer Related to Coastal Zones: Evidence from Northeast Asia (Report)
2009
Fisheries Management in Asia: The Way Forward (Thalassorama)
1997
An Introduction to the NMFS Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey with an Emphasis on Economic Valuation (Thalassorama) (Report)
1999
Alaska Halibut Captains' Attitudes Towards Ifqs (Thalassorama)
1996