Desert Storm
The Gulf War and What We Learned
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- $69.99
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- $69.99
Publisher Description
From Saddam Hussein's first bold threats in 1990 to the stunning ground phase of Desert Storm in early 1991, the crisis in the Gulf captured the world's attention. This high-tech, low-cost war was televised nightly from beginning to end, accompanied by on-the-spot interpretations of strategy and its implications. But what did we learn from this crisis? Did the United States bungle its attempts at discouraging Saddam's aggressive actions, or is deterrence simply not a reliable foreign policy tool? Are chemical weapons truly the "poor man's atom bomb"? Does the war represent a good model for future crises, or did circumstances make this war more of an anomaly than a precedent? How did the ail-volunteer U.S. force perform? By combining exciting, detailed vignettes of the crisis with insightful discussions of its consequences, this book opens up an informed debate concerning the true military and geopolitical lessons of the conflict. Representing a distillation of the best thinking on defense and foreign policy in Washington, Desert Storm also incorporates the testimony of the inside players during the crisis—the people who actually planned and fought the war. Combining academic rigor and in-depth military expertise, the authors challenge the complacency of the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the conflict, taking us beyond mere chronicling and instant analysis to a riveting reenactment of the war and the serious consideration of its long-term implications.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
The authors (staff members of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.) cover an impressive amount of ground in this clarifying survey of the Gulf war and its lessons. In their view, the 1990-1991 war demonstrated that the doctrine of deterrence as a national security strategy is bankrupt; that the highly touted theory of maneuver warfare came into its own during Desert Storm (``maneuver warfare can slice inflexible enemies to pieces, destroy their morale, and keep friendly casualties to an absolute minimum''); that an adequate logistical effort is indispensible to victory; and that assembling international coalitions will be necessary for victory in future contingency operations. The Gulf war, they point out, was unique. It was, for instance, the first 24-hour ground war in history: advances in night-vision equipment enabled U.S. troops to fight nonstop. Photos.