Guideposts for the United States Military in the Twenty-first Century: Airpower, Combat Lessons, Military Personnel, Advanced Weapons, Forward Presence, Forward Engagement, Information Superiority

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book reproduces a symposium where fifteen general officers - active duty and retired - representing all of the armed forces met at Boiling AFB, DC, to consider the impact of air power on warfare. The discussion ranged widely across the spectrum of conflict, including combat, education, advanced technology, space weapons, strategy, information warfare, and intelligence. The aim of the symposium participants was to provide guideposts for future leaders.

Arguably, the rise of air power has been the most significant change in warfare during the twentieth century. While World War II demonstrated the tremendous effect and potential of air power, its proper application was misplaced during the Vietnam War. There, instead of adhering to the basic tenet of air power— employing it as an indivisible weapon—political and military leaders parceled out air power among various loosely connected campaigns. The indivisibility of air power theory also fell victim to doctrinal battles among the services. Fortunately, the United States military relearned the proper applications of air power during the Persian Gulf War and more recently confirmed it in Operation Allied Force, the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign over Kosovo. Kosovo demonstrated that the services had bridged the doctrinal divide and progressed toward doctrinal cohesion. Over the past thirty years, the application of air power has received greater emphasis with respect to its purpose, execution, and lower cost. The results have been most beneficial to the security and freedom of the United States and its friends..

Superior technology has enabled the United States to emphasize quality over quantity, talent over mass, firepower over manpower, and innovation over tradition. We have learned that the complacency of our successes threatens our technological superiority. We have also seen our weapons systems acquisition suffer from a ponderous, nonproductive process that emphasizes cost over value, administration over output, and the separation of operators from engineers. To defeat complacency and regain superiority in acquisition, the Department of Defense implemented a series of management reforms that supported continuous competition, concentrated research and development on high-leverage militarily unique technologies, and broke down the barriers between operators and engineers.