Law and Tunneling. Law and Tunneling.

Law and Tunneling‪.‬

The Journal of Corporation Law 2011, Winter, 37, 2

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Publisher Description

I. INTRODUCTION Managers and controlling shareholders (insiders) can extract (tunnel) wealth from firms using a variety of methods. Tunneling occurs across both developed (1) and developing (2) markets, and impacts both trading prices and premia paid for corporate control. (3) This Article studies how effectively United States' rules limit tunneling by insiders of public companies. We consider three broad types of tunneling: cash flow tunneling, in which insiders extract some of the firm's current cash flows; asset tunneling, in which insiders buy (sell) assets from (to) the firm at below (above) market prices; and equity tunneling, in which insiders acquire equity at below market price, either from the firm through an equity issuance or from other shareholders, often in a freezeout.

GENRE
Business & Personal Finance
RELEASED
2011
December 22
LANGUAGE
EN
English
LENGTH
98
Pages
PUBLISHER
University of Iowa Journal of Corporation Law
SELLER
The Gale Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation and an affiliate of Cengage Learning, Inc.
SIZE
267.6
KB
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