Not Can I, But Should I: Analyzing the Pre-Existing Conditions Surrounding Successful Third-Party Intervention into Intrastate Conflicts - Analysis of U.S. Interventions in Iran, Libya, and Syria

This excellent late 2018 report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The purpose of this study is to identify the conditions that support successful third-party intervention into foreign intrastate conflicts on behalf of resistance movements—specifically, movements aiming at revolution or regime change. While the United States successfully intervened into and even generated resistance movements during the Cold War, most of its interventions failed to achieve strategic objectives. That trend continues today: most saliently, the U.S. military is still present in Afghanistan after nearly two decades, with no successful conclusion in sight. The ongoing war in Afghanistan is the product of strategic decision-making that focused on achieving a specific outcome without considering the pre-existing conditions necessary to achieve success. In order to deter such an outcome, decision-makers must develop more trenchant decision calculus surrounding third-party intervention. To identify the pre-existing conditions that facilitate success, this thesis uses quantitative analysis of intrastate conflicts to determine the effects of political, military, economic, social, and informational condition types upon rebel victory and loss; government victory; and the level of violence within the conflict. Three case studies serve as a means to apply the empirical results and to draw salient conclusions based upon actual conflicts.

This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

I. Framing the Problem and Our Analysis * A. Introduction * B. Research Question * C. Definitions * D. Analytical Framework * E. Literature Review * F. Methodology * 1. Quantitative Analysis * 2. Case Studies * II. Quantitative Analysis * A. Hypotheses * 1. Rebel Victory * 2. Rebel Loss * 3. Government Victory * 4. Level of Violence * B. Empirical Strategy * 1. Building the Data Frame * 2. Dependent Variables * 3. Independent Variables * C. Models * D. Results * 1. Rebel Victory (Models: 1-4, T1, T2) * 2. Rebel Loss (Model 5) * 3. Government Victory (Models 6 and 7) * 4. Level of Violence (Model 8) * 5. Summary * E. Conclusion * III. U.S. Intervention Into Iran: 1953 * A. Historical Framework * B. Conditions * 1. Political Conditions * 2. Economic Conditions * 3. Social Conditions * 4. Informational Conditions * 5. The Coup * C. Conclusion * IV. U.S. Intervention Into Libya: 2009 * A. Historical Framework * B. Conditions * 1. Political Conditions * 2. Economic Conditions * 3. Social Conditions * C. Conclusion * V. U.S. Intervention Into Syria: 2009 to Present Day * A. Introduction * B. Historical Framework * C. The Conditions * 1. Political Conditions * 2. The Military Conditions * 3. Economic and Infrastructural Conditions, 2000-2011 * 4. The Social Conditions * 5. The Informational Conditions * D. U.S. Intervention * E. Conclusion * VI. Summary and Conclusion

While the United States successfully intervened into and even generated resistance movements during this period, most of its interventions failed to achieve strategic objectives. That trend continues today; most saliently, the U.S. military is still present in Afghanistan after nearly two decades, with no successful conclusion in sight. The initial fight in Afghanistan, between U.S. Special Forces and the Taliban, was a classic third-party intervention into an intrastate conflict—specifically, an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign, leveraging the indigenous Afghan Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban government that had taken control of the country. Yet the United States was unable to capitalize on the U.S. Special Forces' tactical victory, and 17 years later, it finds itself still working to stabilize Afghanistan.