Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed? Looking at Inconsistencies and Omission in Joint and Service Doctrine, Suggested Modifications to Air and Ground Component Doctrine

This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficulties in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat power to bear on a stronger than originally anticipated foe. In the seven years of study and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the most part agreed that with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed less risk to US and coalition personnel. While many commentators have noted that suboptimal command and control relationships, lack of communication, and confusion all contributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few have examined the joint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negatively influenced the smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks to determine if any inconsistencies or omissions in joint and service doctrine may have contributed to the problems with air and ground integration observed in Operation Anaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequately addressed any systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where modern doctrine still does not address the key problems noted in Anaconda, the study will suggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihood that the key "lessons observed" from the operation truly become "lessons learned" in the institutional consciousnesses of the ground and air components.

Determining the best way to integrate the capabilities of the different US military services—increasing "jointness"—has been a continuous challenge in modern warfare. Despite the vast increases in communications and information sharing capabilities that have accompanied digitalization, integrating the efforts of the various services continues to present a challenge. These problems of integration have been especially acute between the United States' oldest and youngest military services—namely, the US Army and US Air Force. Over their sixty plus year relationship, in both peacetime and war, the two services have often argued and debated over what the proper relationships should be between the ground and air components, and how they should be defined. Both have codified these beliefs in their individual service doctrines, which respond to joint doctrine from their own service's perspective, and also provide the intellectual underpinnings of their permanent and abiding partnership between the ground and air focused services. But outside of actual combat, there are seldom sufficiently robust opportunities to see if the various doctrines are compatible in the actual practice of high intensity combat. This paper will examine a case study from recent combat history in which the ties between the Army and Air Force were indeed tested, and were by many accounts found wanting.

From a results based viewpoint, March 2002's Operation Anaconda was a tactical success against Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan, with the key events of the operation summarized as follows: Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 218, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of US and allied forces. US casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the US military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge.