System Shock: The Archetype of Operational Shock - Chaos, Deep Battle, and Complexity Theory in the Gray Zone, Examination of Russian War Strategy from First World War Era

This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The primary research question for this study is whether the U.S. can use the concept of 'system shock' to better operate in the Grey Zone. 'System shock' combines ideas from systems theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory to link the ideas of bifurcation and operational shock. System shock is an archetype for military operations that focuses on bifurcating any opposing system to achieve operational shock. This monograph argues that system shock provides military leaders and planners with a framework to fight and win in Grey Zone environments and that this concept nests within Unified Land Operations (ULO) doctrine by testing three claims. The first claim is that system shock is a useful framework to interpret and affect system behavior. The second claim is that the Grey Zone is a complex adaptive system, which allows the system shock framework to apply. The final claim is that system shock nests within current US Army ULO doctrine. The theory of system shock does not dictate specific action. Instead, it proposes a conceptual framework to interpret and understand how operations progress and to train the military planner's mind to look for connections in more places and with a greater purpose behind short-term gains. The theory of system shock can help leaders and planners best identify and address the correct problem in the Gray Zone and other military operations. Therefore, this monograph provides operational artists and military practitioners with an additional lens to use when planning and executing operations.

Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. The System Shock Framework 4. The Gray Zone 5. Unified Land Operations 6. Analysis 7. Conclusion

A problem with the current set of military operations planning tools is not their inherent usefulness, but the foundational logic planners and leaders use when they implement them. Currently, the predominant logic comes from the first grammar of war, which focuses on simply overthrowing the enemy's forces. The combination of complexity and systems theories, with a focus on operational shock, provides practitioners with a set of tools that allows them to operate independently of either grammar, but which may offer new insights into planning for second grammar warfare. By focusing on the opposing system as a whole versus simply overthrowing the enemy force, leaders and planners can develop operational approaches which address an opposing system or systems based on their unique environment. When developing operational approaches, this logic offers a real benefit by encouraging a different focus for operations.

Another benefit of an operational shock focus is the ability for a military force using limited means to successfully oppose an opponent fighting an existential crisis with all means available. This type of conflict, where one side is fully committed, and the other is not, relates most closely to second grammar operations. One of the biggest potential problems with these conflicts is that the United States military engages in limited war against opponents fighting an absolute war. Such a mismatch in means can be linked to Clausewitz's idea that war is a duel on a bigger scale. This idea, Clausewitz argued, means that an enemy's will to fight and continue fighting should be matched by the will of friendly forces, otherwise friendly forces will lose.