The English Prison System. 1921

CHAPTER I.

THE MEANING OF


"PRISON REFORM."

"Prison Reform" is a phrase of many meanings. It is used indifferently by the publicist who is seeking a correct definition of the function of punishment: by the utilitarian who doubts if the official system of administration is fulfilling its State purpose: by the humanitarian whose pity is stirred by the inevitable austerity of a system, inflexibly applied to all who suffer deprivation of liberty, and whose mechanical operation might, in their opinion, be relaxed relatively to the vastly different mental and physical states of all the categories of human beings coming, in one way or another, within the domain of the criminal law.

All agree that the System should be, as far as possible, 'Reformatory,' but many are tempted to overlook that it must be also, if punishment is to have any meaning, coercive, as restraining liberty; deterrent, as an example; and retributory, in the sense of enforcing a penalty for an offence. When Plato said that the object of punishment is to "make an offender good," he did not intentionally underestimate the 'retributory' theory of punishment. He only meant that, in the language of modern philosophy,


 we must respect the reversionary rights of humanity, and while inflicting punishment for an anti-social act, must not lose sight of the duty of restoring, if possible, the offender to society as a better man or woman. As stated by the Committee of 1894, we must not regard him or her as "a hopeless and worthless element of the community." It must be admitted that chastisement by pain (i.e. temporary deprivation of liberty and all that that implies) appeals only to the lower nature, but it is effective in suggesting the consciousness of what the system of human rights means—the system which is maintained by a strong collective determination that it shall not be violated with impunity. This is commonly called 'retribution,' but it has nothing to do with vindictiveness or private vengeance. Society without such a collective determination to resent and punish anti-social acts would be a welter of anarchy and disorder. Let us not then be tempted in the goodness of our hearts, and in the strength of our human pity and sympathy, to overlook the necessary foundation of punishment, which is the assertion of the system of rights by pain or penalty—not pain in its physical sense, but pain that comes from degradation and the loss of self-respect.

There is some confusion in the everyday use of the phrases 'Prison Reform' and 'Penal Reform'. Formerly, 'Prison Reform' meant the structural reform of prisons, sanitation, order, cleanliness. To-day, it means the reform of the "prisoner" by improved methods of influence and treatment while in prison. 'Penal Reform' means strictly the reform of penal law, or of the system of punishment—a question of State policy, with which Parliament and the Judiciary are primarily concerned. These are, of course, greatly influenced by public sentiment and opinion. It is a difficult, complex, and subtle problem, for the solution of which we require legal knowledge, administrative experience, and a nice judgment of the temper of the community, and of the balance which should be kept between the just, and even stern, maintenance of the system of public rights and the rights of the individual human being, which must always be respected, even under chastisement. 'Prison Reform' is


 not a theory of punishment: it is an incident of it: it is a question how far we can assert the rights of the State without unnecessary, or excessive, or unprofitable moral and physical damage to the individual.

Of physical damage we need not speak, for it must, I think, be conceded that the medical care of prisoners in this country is as exact, and patient, and considerate, as can be secured by an able, humane, and untiring medical staff.

With moral damage it is different. The most sanguine would hardly expect that, even with the most approved methods, the 'flétrissure' of punishment can be entirely avoided: the blow to pride and self-respect, and of the respect of one's fellow creatures, must constitute a damage which, if not irreparable, must be heavy and even lasting. A humane administration will try and mitigate this inevitable incident of all punishment. Its first and primary function must be, of course, to secure obedience, discipline, order, and the habit of industry. These things alone have a great moral value. Many cruelties have been enacted in the past in the name of prison discipline—solitude, darkness, chains, floggings, tread wheels and cranks, even until a comparatively recent period, were regarded as the essential accessories of punishment. In studying the history of punishment, we cannot fail to be struck by the singular inventiveness of the human mind in designing forms of suffering for those who broke the law—crucifixion, mutilation, stoning, drowning, torture. It was not until the folly of unprofitable and cruel punishment had been illustrated, as in this country, by its failure to correct, or prevent, or until the certainty of punishment was recognized as the real deterrent for crime, that the penal system was rationalized, and by a slow process, due to a progressive widening of the circle of humanity, to what M. Tarde describes as "la propagation ambiante des exemples," the civilized races of the world laid down the sharp and cruel instruments by which alone it had been believed that society could be avenged, and justice secured. It came slowly to be recognized, not only as a religious, but as a political truth, that the worst criminal possessed 'reversionary rights of humanity,' and


 that it was only by respecting these that there existed the chance, and the hope, that a man might be reformed by punishment, and not thrown back again into the world with only one burning desire to avenge himself for the cruelties which society had indicted upon him. This is the meaning of the Platonic maxim that the purpose of punishment is "to make men good."

How do we try and 'make prisoners good in English Prisons'? Admitting the necessity for strict regulation to secure order, discipline, and obedience, what are the Reformatory influences in English Prisons? Let us first consider the nature and character of the population to whom these influences are to be applied. True, that they are all human beings, with 'reversionary rights of humanity'; but what an infinite variety of mental and physical states: what an infinite degree of will-power, of self-conciousness, and of self-control, of capacity to realize and to understand. Let us regard them as a College or University of persons of all ages, sexes, and dispositions, and let us not forget that this 'corpus' on which our reforming influences are to be brought to bear is, for the time being, not subject to all the impulses, stimuli, hopes, rewards and temptations to which persons in free life are subject. It was well and truly said by the Home Secretary (Mr. Churchill) in the House of Commons, in 1910, "the mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country. A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and even of the convicted, criminal against the State—a constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment—a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every man. These are the symbols, which, in the treatment of crime and criminal, mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue in it." There could not be better words than


 these to inscribe as a phylactery on the brow of every prison administration throughout the world. They are, indeed, the test of civilization. Do our works in this country correspond to this profession of faith?