The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science
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3,0 • 1 note
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- 21,99 $
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- 21,99 $
Description de l’éditeur
A paradigm-shifting, widely acclaimed work for our generation, The Knowledge Machine revolutionizes our understanding of the origins and structure of science.
Michael Strevens’s “provocative and fascinating” (Jennifer Szalai, New York Times) investigation of science asks two fundamental questions: Why is science so powerful? And why did it take so long for the human race to start using science to learn the secrets of nature? The Knowledge Machine’s radical answer is that science, by nature, calls on its practitioners to do the irrational. By willfully ignoring religion, theoretical beauty, and especially philosophy, scientists embrace an unnaturally narrow method of inquiry, channeling unprecedented energy into observation and experimentation. Rich with vivid historical examples and widely acclaimed, Knowledge Machine overturns many of our most basic assumptions about scientific discovery.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Strevens (Thinking Off Your Feet), an NYU philosophy professor, takes a scholarly look at how modern science arose with this erudite study. He begins by examining impactful explanations for the scientific method's success, chiefly Karl Popper's position that science is defined by a rigorous commitment to finding evidence opposed to, as well as in support of, one's own theories, and Thomas Kuhn's idea of scientific paradigms, or culturally dominant theories which scientists gain intellectual clout by subscribing to. After pointing out these arguments' flaws, he outlines his own "Iron Rule of Explanation," which sees "empirical testing" as science's defining principle. While modern scientists are still susceptible to error and bias, Strevens writes, the iron rule sets hard data as the foundation of their theories, and this sets their work apart from the ancient and middle ages' often quite ingenious but less practically useful natural philosophy. Strevens supports his arguments with historical examples, like Arthur Eddington's 1919 eclipse viewing intended to substantiate Einstein's theory of general relativity; he notes that Eddington took great care in the collection of data, but not, contrary to Popper, in considering contradictory or ambiguous evidence, nor, contrary to Kuhn, in adhering to previously established scientific consensus. For readers curious about why science works as well as it does, Strevens provides a convincing answer.
