The Mess We're In
Why Politicians Can't Fix Financial Crises
-
- $16.99
-
- $16.99
Publisher Description
"An insightful analysis by the bestselling author Guy Fraser-Sampson of the reasons why politicians have put the world into financial ruin and have found no way out
Around the world, countries are struggling to deal with the aftermath of the 2007–08 banking crisis, hefty budget deficits, the threat of ongoing recession, and the rising costs of pension provision. The news is full of doom and gloom about the ever-growing mess the countries are in. But the real problem is that the very people who should be sorting it out are instead making it worse. In an entertaining mix of historical narrative and conceptual analysis, Guy Fraser-Sampson argues that the present crisis has in fact been several decades in the making, and is the inevitable outcome of years of neglect and betrayal by those trusted to serve and govern over the public. Taking Britain as his test case, he looks back at key economic policy decisions since 1919 to reveal how politicians through the ages have gotten it so badly wrong. In The Mess We’re In, Fraser-Sampson sets out the facts to support his claim that, at every opportunity, the political elite has prioritized self-interest over long-term national wellbeing and have caused the current situation; now the time has come for them to be called into account."
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Political responses almost inevitably worsen financial crises, argues finance and economics writer Fraser-Sampson (No Fear Finance) in this thoughtful reflection on the contemporary economic morass that was triggered by the 2007 2008 banking meltdown. The crux of the issue lies in the imbalance between short terms of office and the longer time needed to work out economic problems. Yet Fraser-Sampson is more interested in historical background than diatribe, applying theories from Keynes and Marx, as well as the lessons of the U.S. Marshall Plan, to Britain as a test case. His somewhat rambling review of post-Depression history concentrates on what he sees as the perversion of Keynesian doctrine into justification for permanent budget deficits. His interweaving of history and economics, with its emphasis on postwar Britain, illustrates the often-dire practical consequences of policy decisions. Envisioning a rising tide of potential inflationary disaster, Fraser-Sampson argues for limited government and a restriction of unilateral powers. Policymakers will view this proposal as anathema, and the means of enacting it are unclear. But the basic thesis will surely find supporters, and the ordinary reader may see it as a starting point on the road not yet taken.
