Walter D. MC Laughlin v. Union -Leader

The defendant's contention in support of its motion for a new trial is based on its claim that it did not have an impartial
trial and was therefore deprived of the due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This argument cannot be accepted. The record of the previous transfer
to this court (McLaughlin v. Union-Leader , 99 N.H. 492) discloses that by its motion for a mistrial and to set aside the
verdict the defendant raised the same issues under the state Constitution relative to an impartial trial upon which it now
seeks to prevail. The Court by its denial of these motions found as a fact that the jurors were qualified and indifferent
and that no matters outside the evidence produced the verdict. Had it found otherwise that the defendant had an impartial
jury and a fair trial, it would have been the Court's duty to set aside the verdict. It is not to be presumed that the Trial
Court failed to observe this elementary rule of law. On the contrary, all presumptions are in favor of the legality of its
action. Chabot v. Shiner, 95 N.H. 252, 255; Lupien v. Rousseau, 98 N.H. 459, 460. As we have previously stated the Court's
findings are "entitled to great weight." McLaughlin v. Union-Leader, supra, 499. It has failed to revise its previous action
and our re-examination of the record discloses nothing to warrant disturbing our former Conclusion. It follows that the defendant's
exception to the denial of its motion to vacate the order denying a new trial is overruled. Both parties have excepted to the ruling allowing the plaintiff interest from November 1, 1952, the date of the "completion
of the contract term." Commencing with the breach of the contract in September 1949, monthly payments, and also from time
to time other amounts representing profit shares and insurance benefits, became due the plaintiff. The defendant argues that
because the precise total owed the plaintiff could not be ascertained in advance of trial, since no one could tell what the
plaintiff would or might reasonably earn in mitigation of damages, the defendant was under no duty to pay any interest until
after the verdict. If we adopt this argument we take from the plaintiff substantial sums which he can reasonably claim are
his, and allow the defendant, which the jury has found in default, to retain them.