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Wanted from the SEC: Investor-Oriented Leadership. (The Mutual Fund Distribution Expense Mess)
The Journal of Corporation Law 2007, Summer, 32, 4
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Publisher Description
Congress expressly invited searching scrutiny of fund industry sponsors and managers when it made this policy finding, which was included in this language in the 1940 Act: The SEC was vested with regulatory power over the fund industry and has used that power extensively. In the words of a former SEC chairman, "[n]o issuer of securities is subject to more detailed regulation than a mutual fund." (364) The last five years show there is a difference between detailed regulation and careful, intelligent oversight. In a nutshell, the mutual fund industry has been over-regulated and under-policed. (365)
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