Fixing Intelligence
For a More Secure America
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- CHF 25.00
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- CHF 25.00
Beschreibung des Verlags
William E. Odom is the highest-ranking member of the United States Intelligence community ever to write a book outlining fundamental restructuring of this vast network of agencies, technology, and human agents. In the wake of 9/11, Odom has revised and updated a powerful critique he wrote several years ago for staffs of the U.S. congressional committee overseeing the vast American intelligence bureaucracy. His recommendations for revamping this essential component of American security are now available for general readers as well as for policymakers.
While giving an unmatched overview of the world of U.S. intelligence, Odom persuasively shows that the failure of American intelligence on 9/11 had much to do with the complex bureaucratic relationships existing among the various components of the Intelligence Community. The sustained fragmentation within the Intelligence Community since World War II is part of the story; the blurring of security and intelligence duties is another. Odom describes the various components of American intelligence in order to give readers an understanding of how complex they are and what can be done to make them more effective in providing timely intelligence and more efficient in using their large budgets. He shows definitively that they cannot be remedied with quick fixes but require deep study of the entire bureaucracy and the commitment of the U.S. government to implement the necessary reforms.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
"The weakness of U.S. counterintelligence is difficult to exaggerate," says Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, and "patching and repairing here and there" won't solve the problem. Here he presents a far-reaching proposal for revamping the intelligence community, but it's no page-turner. Based on a report originally published in 1997 by a think tank, this book argues that intelligence gathering must be streamlined and cooperation increased among the many existing intelligence agencies. Perhaps Odom's most broad-ranging reform would be to create a national counterintelligence service, which he says would eliminate both competition among the various agencies and the gaps in knowledge that result from such competition. Elsewhere, he proposes broad changes in the makeup of both the FBI and the CIA. These ideas, while presented six years ago by the author, were rarely seriously discussed before September 11, and the author himself admits they are likely to meet resistance from the turf-protecting intelligence community. Odom makes a strong case that they are necessary to fight the changing threats to U.S. security. All too often, though, his language makes his points difficult to follow ("until greater resource management rationality is achieved, progress in integrating the tactical intelligence capabilities will be erratic and more by chance than design"). The book still reads too much like a report to command the wide readership its arguments warrant. It probably will, however, feed media discussions about intelligence reform and the new Homeland Security Department.