Law and Economics: Realism Or Democracy? (Twenty-Seventh Annual National Federalist Society Student Symposium) Law and Economics: Realism Or Democracy? (Twenty-Seventh Annual National Federalist Society Student Symposium)

Law and Economics: Realism Or Democracy? (Twenty-Seventh Annual National Federalist Society Student Symposium‪)‬

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 2009, Wntr, 32, 1

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Beschreibung des Verlags

Is law and economics anti-democratic? One hears complaints from many quarters that law and economics is a form of technocracy that cuts off legitimate debate and suppresses other important values that people hold dear. (1) On this view, law and economics privileges efficiency and focuses on quantifiable values to the exclusion of other, less measurable values that could have found expression through the political process. These concerns are central to debates in areas ranging from environmental protection to intellectual property. The irony in these complaints is that they are offered by commentators who are heirs of the legal realists, many of whom would in the same breath decry excessive formalism and applaud judicial sensitivity to policy. There may not be an inherent contradiction here, but there is a tension in practice. Law and economics and democracy are not enemies, but I contend that legal realism--or its lingering aftershocks--causes law and economics to be more technocratic and less democratic than necessary. While legal realism as a movement itself may be dead, it rules us from the grave. As the saying goes, "We are all realists now." (2) There is nothing wrong with law-and-economics-inspired theories as theories--or with legal realism as a theory for that matter. Analyzing law and legal relations in their smallest parts and considering micro incentive effects (to the extent data is available) are worthy exercises, but without some sensitivity to institutional detail and competence, the tendency is to substitute the wisdom of the analyzing expert, especially in courts and agencies, for the collective wisdom emerging either from democracy or tradition. (3)

GENRE
Gewerbe und Technik
ERSCHIENEN
2009
1. Januar
SPRACHE
EN
Englisch
UMFANG
34
Seiten
VERLAG
Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.
GRÖSSE
309.2
 kB

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