Little America
The War Within the War for Afghanistan
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- CHF 4.50
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- CHF 4.50
Beschreibung des Verlags
A New York Times Notable Book
The author of the acclaimed bestseller and National Book Award finalist, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, tells the startling, behind-the-scenes story of the US’s political and military misadventure in Afghanistan. In this meticulously reported and illuminating book, Rajiv Chandrasekaran focuses on southern Afghanistan in the year of President Obama’s surge, and reveals the epic tug of war that occurred between the president and a military that increasingly went its own way. The profound ramifications this political battle had on the region and the world are laid bare through a cast of fascinating characters—disillusioned and inept diplomats, frustrated soldiers, headstrong officers—who played a part in the process of pumping American money and soldiers into Afghan nation-building. What emerges in Little America is a detailed picture of unsavory compromise—warlords who were to be marginalized suddenly embraced, the Karzai family transformed from foe to friend, fighting corruption no longer a top priority—and a venture that became politically, financially, and strategically unsustainable.
Also:
A Washington Post Notable Book
A St. Louis Post-Dispatch Best Book of the Year
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Chandrasekaran, senior correspondent and associate editor of the Washington Post, follows his award-winning analysis of postinvasion Iraq, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, with a searing indictment of how President Barack Obama's 2009 Afghanistan surge was carried out. Drawing on his reporting from Afghanistan over a period of two and a half years and over 70 interviews conducted for this project, the author examines the Obama administration's efforts to "resuscitate a flatlining war." What he finds in his extensive travels, especially in the strategic southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, is a smorgasbord of incompetence, venality, and infighting. It's only when the Marines pivot away from counterinsurgency on which the surge is predicated to counterterrorism that they begin "to shift the momentum of the war." This success proves temporary when Obama begins to reverse the surge and the Taliban switch to a "long-term game." Chandrasekaran argues that the surge was "a missed opportunity" and that its failure rests largely with "the American bureaucracy": a Pentagon that was "too tribal"; incompetent civilian officials, especially at USAID; and a flawed Obama policy to go "big" instead of going "long." Solid and timely reporting, crackling prose, and more than a little controversy will make this one of the summer's hot reads.