- CHF 7.00
Beschreibung des Verlags
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The 2004 counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan was historic. Service personnel of general purpose, special operations, coalition, and irregular forces worked in unison to defeat the insurgency in a country stricken by war. Their unwavering trust, cooperation, close integration, collaborative planning, and nested execution were in many cases, textbook. In recognition of their professional effort, this case study captures many of the lessons learned in their planning and operations. Success in Afghanistan also came from the determination of millions of Afghans who were supported by these gallant sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen.
Chapter 1 - Introduction * Chapter 2 - The True Believer, the Enemy At Large * Chapter 3 - Tenets of War in Afghanistan and the Afghan Resistance * Chapter 4 - Historic Paralleling and Principles of COIN Campaigning * Chapter 5 - Optimizing Command, Control, and Coordination in a COIN Environment * Chapter 6 - Combat Operations in Afghanistan: Find, Fix, and Finish the Enemy and Remove the Causes of Instability * Chapter 7 - Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in COIN * Chapter 8 - Results Achieved, Key Lessons Learned, and the Next Level
Lieutenant Colonel Bogart, with the help of other Army Special Forces members, has authored an insightful monograph about conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan. Through the operational lens of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in their 2004 campaign against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda supporters, One Valley details the accomplishments of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) 76. Bogart's work shares the experiences and perspectives of SOF planners as they developed their COIN strategy and organized to conduct the campaign.
This planners' viewpoint—a slice of perspective in the ongoing Long War—provides valuable insight. This work describes the operational and tactical successes of brave SOF warriors working with their Afghan and other coalition partners. With the advantage of hindsight, one hopes the work of CJSOTF-A 76 will stand the test of time as the recent resurgence of Taliban operations in the summer of 2006 indicates clearly the need to continue the fight.
LTC Bogart's work is extremely valuable. One Valley enumerates the thought processes and the challenges for conducting a COIN campaign in Afghanistan. As Lieutenant General David Barno wrote in his summer 2006 Parameters article, "The Taliban often reminded villagers: The Americans may have all the wristwatches, we have all the time.'" The Taliban and LTC Bogart have arrived at the same conclusion—the Afghan people are the ultimate decision makers in the conflict. Whomever they choose to support and follow will rule Afghanistan. While it is not possible to defeat an insurgency in a year's time, this monograph demonstrates that we can establish an operational foundation upon which to achieve strategic victory.