Velva K. Kennon and Thelma Kennon v. Bob

Appellants, who were plaintiffs below, brought an action to set aside a trustee's deed and, in a second count, for damages
against defendants-respondents for wrongful foreclosure. The trial court found and adJudged that the trustee's deed was valid
and conveyed a good title to defendants, subject to a first deed of trust. Other portions of the trial court's judgment, by
which certain funds in the registry of the court were ordered paid to the respective parties, will be hereinafter considered. Prior to the foreclosure sale hereinafter described, plaintiffs Velva Kennon and his wife Thelma owned real estate (about
7 1/2 acres) improved with a house and barn. There was evidence that the property was worth $10,000. A savings and loan association
in Farmington held a first deed of trust executed by the Kennons in September 1953, securing an indebtedness of $5,500 which,
at the time of the foreclosure, had been reduced to $2,737.73. On January 12, 1957, the Kennons executed their six per cent
promissory note for $1,514 payable to Lacy Gower and Cecil Hulsey, d/b/a Gower Insurance Agency, due December 31, 1957, secured
by a second deed of trust on the above-mentioned real estate. The deed provided that upon default in payment of the note the
trustee named therein or, in the event of his refusal to act, the sheriff of St. Francois County might proceed to sell the
property to the highest bidder, first giving 30-days' public notice of the time, terms, etc., by advertisement in some newspaper
printed and published in St. Francois County. On September 21, 1960, for a consideration of $1,200, ownership of the note
and the second deed of trust were transferred to defendant Bob Camp. After some negotiations with plaintiffs relating to a
possible sale of their property to a third party, during which no agreement was reached, defendant (defendant or Camp will
hereinafter refer to Bob Camp) said that he told plaintiffs something would have to be done toward the payment by them of
the note secured by the second deed of trust which he told them he owned or he would have to foreclose the property. Plaintiffs
testified that defendant did not at any time say that he intended to foreclose and never did demand payment of the note which
had been allowed to continue as past due by the original payees. In the view we take, the conflict in the testimony in that
respect is of no consequence.