Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War - Collection of Recently Declassified Intelligence Documents, Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea 1950, Cryptology and Chinese Intervention

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The Korean War erupted less than three years after President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. Before North Korean forces invaded the South on 25 June 1950, the CIA had only a few officers in Korea, and none reported to the Agency’s analytic arm, the Office of Research and Estimates (ORE). Analytical production relating to Korea reflected the generally low priority given the region by the Truman Administration’s State Department and the military services.

Critics of ORE analysis before and after 1950 have noted the lack of any predictive estimates or other "actionable" indications and warning intelligence that would have allowed U.S. policymakers to act on Korean events before they reached the crisis stage. Yet CIA analysts did report frequently on Korea in the prewar years, although from a perspective that highlighted the Soviet Union's involvement and saw Far Eastern events as the result of Soviet machinations and grand designs for world domination. Given the American adherence to the concept of a monolithic world communist movement controlled from the Kremlin, it is perhaps understandable that CIA viewed Korean events as just one of many fronts in the Cold War, closely interrelated with other Soviet-induced crises but not of any greater importance. While analysts accurately and consistently reported current intelligence, the reports did not emphasize that the Korean situation represented anything extraordinary beyond routine Soviet mischief-making and proxy-sponsored "tests" of American resolve. ORE reporting from 1947 through 1950 did provide many ominous predictions and indicated possibilities of future crises, yet in a world menaced by communists everywhere, its reporting on Korea did not stand out.

Starting in 1949, CIA reporting on the potential for war in Korea became more explicit, especially as proposals for withdrawing American forces came closer to reality. The 28 February Review of the World Situation stated, "... it is doubtful if the Republic could survive a withdrawal of U.S. troops in the immediate future." In the absence of a U.S. military presence, "it is highly probable that northern Korean alone, or northern Koreans assisted by other Communists, would invade southern Korea and subsequently call upon the USSR for assistance. Soviet control or occupation of Southern Korea would be the result."

Contents: Baptism by Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War * Overview * Korean War Timeline of Major Events * Perceptions and Reality: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950 * Selected Intelligence Documents