Keeping China in the War

The trans-Himalayan airlift of World War II, better known as the “Hump,” is recognized among specialists as the first sustained and most ambitious combat airlift operation in modern history. Cobbled together with only a handful of airplanes and aircrews in early 1942, the operation grew to become the ultimate expression of the US government’s commitment to China, in the end delivering nearly 740,000 tons of cargo. This was no small feat, either, as the US Army Air Forces’ aircraft flew in what is arguably the world’s worst weather system and over its most rugged terrain, all the while under the threat of enemy attack. The thesis of this dissertation is that the Hump airlift was initially started to serve as a display of American support for its Chinese ally who had been at war with Japan since 1937. However, by the start of 1944, with the airlift’s capability gaining momentum, American strategists set aside concerns for the ephemeral concept of Chinese national will and used the airlift as the primary means of supplying American forces in China in preparation for the US’s final assault on Japan. Strictly from the standpoint of war materiel, it comes as no surprise that the airlift was the precondition that had to be met to make possible all other allied military action, as it was an enabling force in the theater. It dictated the level of effort the Americans could bring to bear against the Japanese, being the sole route to China until the end of 1944, when the Ledo (or Stilwell) Road opened. Other routes were discussed and attempted, but in the end the only way for supplies to get into China was over the Himalayas. The airlift was also a driver of CBI strategy, as it was an expression of the broader airpower orientation of the theater. Difficult terrain, extreme weather, and primitive roads all combined to make the CBI a theater best traversed by air. It was in the CBI, and only in the CBI, that allied troops were most commonly inserted, supplied, and extracted by air.