Alexander v. Johnson

Dorothy M. Alexander appeals from the district courts dismissal of her civil rights action against members of the North Carolina Parole Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Corrections. Alexander sued these state officers in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that their practice of requiring selected indigent inmates to make restitution for the costs of court-appointed counsel as a condition of parole violated the constitutional standards established in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974), and James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 32 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1972). Although she challenged the facial validity of some aspects of the states restitution program, her principal claim was that the repayment requirement was unconstitutionally applied to her and other similarly-situated indigent inmates. In dismissing Alexanders suit, the district court upheld the facial constitutionality of the State of North Carolinas restitution program under the applicable standards of Fuller and James, and concluded that Alexander had produced no evidence demonstrating that the statutes had been misapplied in her case. We affirm both the district courts decision upholding the constitutionality of the North Carolina restitution program and its order dismissing Alexanders claim that the program had been unconstitutionally applied to her. We do not agree with all of the district courts reasoning concerning the validity of North Carolinas restitution scheme as it was applied in this case, but affirm the courts dismissal of Alexanders action because she has not exhausted state remedies available to her. She essentially challenges the lawfulness of the restraints placed on her freedom and thus her claim seeks relief more appropriately pursued through specific remedies available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).