An Existential-Phenomenological Inquiry Into the Meaning of Clinical Supervision: What Do We Mean when We Talk About 'Existential-Phenomenological Supervision?(Report‪)‬

Introduction Though a small number of 'positional' papers on an existential approach to supervision have appeared over the years in the existential journals, (Pett, 1995; Wright, 1999; Mitchell, 2000; Adams, 2002; du Plock 1998; 2007), our knowledge of what actually occurs in what is called existential supervision is remarkably sparse. Little, if any, reference is made in this regard by authors in the existential tradition when writing about client work; I do not know of a comprehensive text dedicated to this area published before 2009. If we think specifically about research, as against reflection, there is a paucity of published work. Given this, I was grateful to Emmy van Deurzen and Sarah Young for asking me to contribute a chapter to their edited text on existential supervision, Existential Perspectives on Supervision. The opportunity to set down the idiosyncratic theory of existential supervision which informs my own practice was salutary in that, as is so frequently the case when we attempt to express the values and motives encapsulated in our way of being, it raised more questions than answers for me.