Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence

THE THEME OF THIS STUDY is that the conventional defense of Europe is achievable today, or in the near future, provided NATO is willing to think through the consequences; modify national and Alliance strategies; and accept a slightly higher, but not unacceptable, degree of near-term risk. This in no sense should give the impression that NATO is home free on conventional defense. On the contrary, given continuing Soviet modernization programs and the known deficiencies within the Alliance, especially in logistics, there is an urgent requirement to press ahead with what Henry Kissinger refers to as the “desperately needed NATO conventional buildup.”1 While some may question whether the need is desperate or just urgent, the current margin for successful conventional defense is too slim. Even under the best conditions, the Alliance’s survival could depend on Soviet inefficiency and be threatened by relatively low-level tactical blunders of its own. Clearly, a buildup is required to provide some margin for error.

Moreover, neither will a strong conventional defense ever be a substitute for nuclear deterrence. It cannot. But, with the advent of essential nuclear parity at all levels, certain assumptions the West has made concerning the utility of nuclear weapons are now questionable. In 1946, writing about the effect of atomic weapons on military policy, Bernard Brodie said that “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”2 The extent to which his observation on nuclear arms has been stretched to include all military force is reflected today in the many references to “conventional deterrence.” At any rate, Brodie’s paradoxical view of the military’s function—and strategy—is no longer as true as it seemed in 1946. The Soviets, who never have subscribed doctrinally to his view, understand that conventional superiority gives them real advantages, both politically and militarily. At the least, it opens opportunities for political intimidation. At worst, the Kremlin may someday believe that there is an “umbrella” of nuclear parity under which a conventional war may be fought to advantage. Soviet leaders may well imagine, in some crisis tomorrow or a decade from now, a conflict scenario in which the two sides withhold nuclear weapons use, fearing the consequences of uncontrollable escalation.3 To borrow a phrase, a strong NATO conventional defense capability should be part of the “seamless garment” of deterrence, an equal part of a NATO defense policy that rests on a balance of nuclear and nonnuclear forces, as well as on political and economic strengths, that leads to a rational conclusion, and that denies any advantage to the Soviets which might tempt them in time of a crisis.