Cross of Iron
The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, 1918-1945
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- 12,99 €
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- 12,99 €
Beschreibung des Verlags
A riveting account of the origins and development of the German army that breaks through the distortions of conventional military history
Acclaimed for his revisionist history of the German Army in World War I, John Mosier continues his pioneering work in Cross of Iron, offering an intimate portrait of the twentieth-century German army from its inception, through World War I and the interwar years, to World War II and its climax in 1945.
World War I has inspired a vast mythology of bravery and carnage, told largely by the victors, that has fascinated readers for decades. Many have come to believe that the fast ascendancy of the Allied army, matched by the failure of a German army shackled by its rigidity, led to the war's outcome. Mosier demystifies the strategic and tactical realities to explain that it was Germany's military culture that provided it with the advantage in the first war. Likewise, Cross of Iron offers stunning revelations regarding the weapons of World War II, forcing a reevaluation of the reasons behind the French withdrawal, the Russian contribution, and Hitler as military thinker. Mosier lays to rest the notion that the army, as opposed to the SS, fought a clean and traditional war. Finally, he demonstrates how the German war machine succeeded against more powerful Allied armies until, in both wars, it was crushed by U.S. intervention.
The result of thirty years of primary research, Cross of Iron is a powerful and authoritative reinterpretation of Germany at war.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Mosier is a professor of English who has developed a second career writing on the world wars (The Blitzkreig Myth). Here he credits the German army's operational effectiveness in two world wars to leadership, doctrine and, above all, institutional memory. The Germans addressed many of modern warfare's fundamental problems in WWI. They built on their experience during the years between the wars, integrating new technologies as they emerged. Quickness of reaction and speed of execution in a framework of combined arms tactics gave the Wehrmacht temporary mastery of Europe in 1939 1942. Though the overall thesis is less original than Mosier recognizes, he presents it in smooth, economical prose, incorporating a number of thought provoking insights and hypotheses. He challenges the familiar allegation that the Wehrmacht neglected logistics and, conversely, demonstrates that German technological superiority is a myth. He credits Hitler's "evil genius" with providing the political and strategic insight that structured Germany's victories until his audacity devolved into randomness. Mosier pitilessly establishes the Wehrmacht's comprehensive complicity in the Third Reich's crimes, but is better at describing than explaining it. Within its limits, this is a stimulating overview of a war machine incorporating both outstanding capacities and tragic flaws.
