Husserl and Kant on Personlichkeit/Husserlis Ir Kantas Apie Personlichkeit (Report‪)‬

Introduction The purpose of this paper is to consider some of the more perplexing and philosophically problematic aspects of Husserl's treatment of moral consciousness in his lectures and writings on ethics from the 1920's. (1) I would like to suggest that some of Husserl's basic philosophical commitments, embodied in the phenomenological method of eidetic investigation, coupled with his desire to shape phenomenological philosophy into a relevant public voice in the interwar period, conspired to obscure the question of selfhood central to the problem of moral consciousness. On the other hand, I would also like to suggest that in the development of Husserl's thought, from the late 1920's up to the Crisis, one can discern a countermovement to this obscurity, and that in the end Husserl offers us a potentially unique and significant perspective for a re-appraisal of the question of moral selfhood.