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Stalemate
The War Of Attrition And Great Power Diplomacy In The Middle East, 19671970
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- USD 52.99
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- USD 52.99
Descripción editorial
For three years following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, Egypt, with a massive infusion of weaponry from the Soviet Union, continued to do battle with Israel in what became known as the War of Attrition. The history of these years holds the key to understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict today. In this book, David A. Korn offers a detailed insider’s account of the first—and, until recently, the only—U.S.-Soviet cooperative effort to bring peace to the Middle East and an explanation of the origin of the “land for peace” formula. He relates a fascinating story of political intrigue in Washington and Jerusalem that stymied the efforts of peacemakers; of Egypt’s massing a huge army along the west bank of the Suez Canal; and of Israel’s desperate search for a strategy to hold the east bank with a token force and minimal losses. He also describes the incredible miscalculation that nearly plunged Israel into war with the Soviet Union and the great heroism on both sides of the Suez line. This book fills a large gap in the history of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors and is the first to analyze war and diplomacy in the Middle East during the critical years of 1967–1970 from the Egyptian as well as the Israeli point of view. To both, Korn brings penetrating insights based on a wealth of materials never before published. It is a gripping story by a writer who had a grandstand seat on the line.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
Following their defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, the Egyptians opened a campaign of attrition against Israel along the Suez Canal line in March of '69, recalls Korn. Their goal: to inflict enough casualties to cause the Israeli Defense Force to withdraw from the Sinai. Lasting 17 months, this conflict was the longest, most difficult and most underreported of Israel's shooting wars. At the diplomatic level, on which this study concentrates, the war extended from the United States debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 242 in '67 to the American initiative in '70 that brought about the cease-fire. Korn sheds new light on the U.S.-Soviet negotiations in '69, which were unique in the history of Arab-Israeli peacemaking--the sole instance in which Washington worked exclusively with Moscow for a Middle East settlement. The thesis of this well-reasoned study is that the Israeli view of the War of Attrition as a victory gave the country a false sense of security that rendered it dangerously vulnerable on October 6, 1973, opening day of the Yom Kippur War. Korn served as political officer and chief of the political section at the American embassy in Israel from 1969 to 1971. Photos.