![Venture Capitalists' Exit Strategies under Information Asymmetry](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
![Venture Capitalists' Exit Strategies under Information Asymmetry](/assets/artwork/1x1-42817eea7ade52607a760cbee00d1495.gif)
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Venture Capitalists' Exit Strategies under Information Asymmetry
Evidence from the US Venture Capital Market
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- USD 84.99
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- USD 84.99
Descripción editorial
Venture capitalists (VCs) fund ventures with the aim of reaping a capital gain upon exit. Research has identified information asymmetry between inside investors and follow-on investors as a major source of friction. It is thus in the interest of VCs to reduce information asymmetry at exit.
Matthias Eckermann analyzes how VCs integrate information efficiency considerations into their exit strategies. He shows that VCs adopt specific strategies to cope with information gaps upon exit in terms of timing, exit vehicles and promotion efforts. On this basis he develops a framework to help VCs to improve profitability through decisive exit strategies.