How Great Generals Win
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- 11,99 €
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- 11,99 €
Descripción editorial
"An astute military historian's appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of War." —Kirkus Reviews
If a key to military victory is to "get there first with the most," the true test of the great general is to decide where "there" is—the enemy's Achilles heel. Here is a narrative account of decisive engagements that succeeded by brilliant strategy more than by direct force. The reader accompanies those who fought, from Roman legionaries and Mongol horsemen to Napoleonic soldiery, American Civil War Rebels and Yankees, World War I Tommies, Lawrence of Arabia's bedouins, Chinese revolutionaries, British Desert Rats, Rommel's Afrika Korps, and Douglas MacArthur's Inchon invaders. However varied their weapons, the soldiers of all these eras followed a commander who faced the same obstacles and demonstrated the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. "All warfare is based on deception," wrote Sun Tzu in The Art of War in 400 BCE. Bevin Alexander shows how great generals have interpreted this advice, and why it still holds true today.
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Alexander ( Korea: The First War We Lost ) reveals how some of the great military men of history applied common-sense principles of warfare that ``nearly always will secure victory.'' Relying on deception, these generals usually won their campaigns with a surprise attack on the enemy's rear or flank. Leaving aside the killed-and-wounded advantage of such maneuvers, Alexander emphasizes the decisive psychological effect on enemy soldiers and their commanders. Generals whose deceptive, indirect, surprise tactics are considered here include Scipio Africanus (``The General Who Beat Hannibal''), Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Stonewall Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman (``The General Who Won the Civil War''), Mao Zedong, Erwin Rommel and Douglas MacArthur. Alexander makes the interesting point that these principles are for the most part self-evident, yet most generals ignore them in favor of the direct frontal assault. He is surprisingly critical of the Confederacy's icon, Robert E. Lee, for his tendency to resort to direct (and costly) methods such as Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. He calls MacArthur ``a military Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, capable of both brilliant strategic insight and desolating error.'' This study is essential reading for students of military strategy and tactics.
