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Description de l’éditeur

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this military study examines counterinsurgencies and the need to control the local population. Counterinsurgency wars made up a significant number of the conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries. These conflicts range from the Philippines in the late 19th and early 20th century to current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As long as an insurgency has a cause, it is relatively simple to start and relatively cheap to maintain for the insurgent. They have the potential to further expand at an alarming rate when a government or foreign occupier (such as the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan) is incapable of providing security and controlling the host nation population. In most cases, history has shown using an iron fist to contain insurgencies makes it difficult for the counterinsurgent to win. The need to control the population through locally raised forces has in one form or another been crucial to the success of the counterinsurgent in many conflicts.
Special Operation Forces (SOF) or some form of SOF played a significant role in every counterinsurgency campaign since the 1940s. The contributions by US Special Forces (USSF) in Vietnam were significant and ultimately validated the organization. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) was the primary counterinsurgency mission for USSF during the Vietnam conflict. This paper argues that the CIDG program was a successful counterinsurgency tool until 1965 when it was used defensively or was terrain-focused. However, once the CIDG program turned into an offensive tool through the Mobile Strike Force (MSF), the program lost its effectiveness at controlling the population throughout the duration of the Vietnam War.
CHAPTER 1 * INTRODUCTION * Literature Review * Research Methodology * Summary * CHAPTER 2 * COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORISTS * Introduction * Defining Insurgency * Mao Tse-Tung * Counterinsurgency Theorists * Sir Robert Thompson * David Galula * Roger Trinquier * Controlling the Population * Conclusion * CHAPTER 3 * THE VIETNAM CAMPAIGN; 1950-1972 * Introduction * Literature Review * Origins of the Conflict: The Advisory Years 1950-1965 * 1950-1954: French Occupation * US Intervention (1954-1965) * Strategic Hamlet Program * President Diem's Assassination and the Successors * American Large-Scale Intervention: 1965 to 1972 * The Beginning of the Offensive * Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support * Tet Offensive of 1968 * Vietnamization * Conclusion * CHAPTER 4 * ORIGINS OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES * Introduction * Literature Review * Origins of United States Special Forces * World War II * Birth of United States' Special Forces * Special Forces in Europe * Expansion of US Special Forces * Early Special Forces in Vietnam * 5th Special Forces Group * Rational * Composition and Structure * Mission * Conclusion * CHAPTER 5 * SPECIAL FORCES IN VIETNAM * Introduction * Key Sources for Studying the Civilian Irregular Defense Group * The Civilian Irregular Defense Group: The Beginnings * Ethnic Makeup of Civilian Irregular Defense Group * Buon Enao Experiment * Expansion of the CIDG Program * Logistical Aspects * Transition of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group from CIA supported to MAG-V Control (Operation Switchback) * Mobile Strike Forces (MIKE Forces) * Mobile Strike Force Command and Control (USSF and CIDG) * Mobile Strike Forces Role within the CIDG * Mobile Strike Forces in Action * Mobile Guerrilla Force * Australian Army Training Team-Vietnam (AATTV) * Conventionalization of the CIDG * Transition of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group to Vietnamese Control * Conclusion * CHAPTER 6 * CONCLUSION * Theorists * Vietnam * United Special Forces Origins * The Civilian Irregular Defense Group * US Special Forces in Afghanistan * Summary

6 mai
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