Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces - Mogadishu, Somali Terrorism, al-Qaeda, Relations with Ethiopia and Kenya

It is commonly understood that a legitimate indigenous government is the sine qua non for any successful counterinsurgency campaign. This monograph, published in February 2014, is designed to serve as a tactical document for members of the special operations community outlining the way in which the international community and AMISOM can best support the Somali Federal Government now that the anti-Shabaab coalition's respective governments have made the decision to do so. It does not attempt to establish whether the policy decision to support the government is correct, as that is a question influenced by a complex set of factors beyond the scope of this document. It assumes that policymakers have calculated that the government can achieve legitimacy, and so operates under the assumption that the policy decision is correct. It further acknowledges that Somalia faces challenges to peace and stability beyond al-Shabaab—the focus of this monograph is on how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign against the group, but there are other thorny challenges beyond the insurgency that also must be addressed before the country will become stable.

This work provides a meaningful context to al-Shabaab and the Somali milieu. Al Shabaab has been pushed from all of its major strongholds by a robust international effort, and its violent Salafism has alienated many Somalis. But it still has teeth. It continues to harass coalition forces, as well as ordinary Somalis, with improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and assassinations. Its tactics reflect a strategic decision made by its leadership to fight a guerrilla war, a familiar role for a group that thrived by waging an anti-Ethiopian insurgency in the mid-2000s.

The work points out that the coalition has not responded with a coherent counterinsurgency campaign dedicated to maintaining and winning Somalis' support. All indications are that it failed to properly plan the best way to fight al-Shabaab's evolution, and it has made its task harder by committing a series of mistakes. Most grievously, Kenya has involved itself in tribal politics in Lower Juba, and appears to be picking favorites in a country infamous for its violent and oftentimes inscrutable clan dynamics.

Lasting peace for a unified Somalia hinges on the establishment of a highly-decentralized but viable and effective indigenous government. But some members of the coalition appear intent on pursuing their own national interests instead. Such a disunified approach badly damages the new government's legitimacy, and makes it impossible to implement a coherent counterinsurgency strategy. The government, for its part, has made little progress in breaking from the corruption and ineffectiveness that so hobbled its predecessors. It is a golden chance for al-Shabaab to pick itself up off the mat.

1. A Brief History of Somalia and al-Shabaab * 2. Al-Shabaab Funding and Recruitment * 3. The Diminishment and Evolution of al-Shabaab * 4. The Challenges of Counterinsurgency in Somalia * 5. Assessing Counterinsurgency Efforts in Somalia * 6. Concluding Thoughts and Lessons for SOF