United States v. O'Dell

This case involves the limits of federal jurisdiction under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.1 O'Dell, Eastman, Moran and Abell (""appellants"") operated massage parlors in Louisville, Kentucky and advertised them in three Louisville newspapers: the Courier-Journal, the Times and the Entertainer. Appellants did not specifically request that their advertisements be included in editions sold outside Kentucky. Nevertheless, all three of these papers send copies into Indiana as a matter of course, and as a result some of appellants' ads were distributed across state lines. In addition to their otherwise legal activities,2 appellants ran local prostitution businesses at the massage parlor locations. Indictments were returned against appellants charging that they had violated the Travel Act by placing massage parlor ads in the Louisville papers with the intent to further illegal prostitution.3 To show the use of a facility of interstate commerce, the government relied completely upon the fact that copies of the Louisville newspapers had been distributed in Indiana. Appellants moved to have the indictments dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Following denial of these motions by the district court, appellants pled guilty on a stipulated set of facts, but conditioned the pleas upon a finding by this court that jurisdiction exists under the Travel Act.4 Thus, the sole issue on this appeal is whether appellants' activities were sufficient to constitute a use of a facility of interstate commerce intended to promote an unlawful act, as required for jurisdiction under the Travel Act. In Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971), the Supreme Court considered the question of the reach of the Travel Act. The defendants in Rewis were convicted under the Act for operating gambling establishments frequented by out-of-state bettors. The Court reversed the convictions and held that ""Congress did not intend that the Travel Act should apply to criminal activity solely because that activity is at times patronized by persons from another State."" 401 U.S. at 812, 91 S. Ct. at 1059. This conclusion was supported by the Court's determination of the purpose of the Travel Act: ""s 1952 was aimed primarily at organized crime and, more specifically, at persons who reside in one State while operating or managing illegal activities located in another."" 401 U.S. at 811, 91 S. Ct. at 1059. The Court also found important the fact that the legislative history of the Travel Act was silent as to the breadth of the Act's application. Because ""Congress would certainly recognize that an expansive Travel Act would alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations in which ... a matter of happenstance, would transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies,"" the Court refused to give an expansive construction to the Travel Act's coverage without more explicit directions from Congress. 401 U.S. at 812, 91 S. Ct. at 1059. Thus, in construing the Travel Act in the present case, we keep in mind two important factors from Rewis. First, the Travel Act is not aimed at local criminal activity; rather, its purpose is to attack crime that has true interstate aspects. Second, courts must be careful not to read the language of the Act so broadly as to have consequences that go beyond congressional intent.