Death in the Perspective of Existential Phenomenology/Mirtis Egzistencines Fenomenologijos Perspektyvoje (Report‪)‬

Introduction How the death in phenomenology has been interpreted? For E. Husserl, differently from M. Heidegger, the death did not become the theme of phenomenological considerations. Here a question emerges: does the death, not being bracketed, have no eidetic dimension, and herewith is not accessible for phenomenological reduction? My major thesis to be developed in this article is the following: the life as an existential project under implementation is the bracketing of the death. The minor thesis follows from the major one: "death" is a criterion of demarcation (border stone) between existential (ontological) and eidetic phenomenology. Heidegger, for who the death had become a core of his Dasein analytics, prefers ontology to ethics. On the contrary, Levinas prefers ethic relations. Meanwhile Ricoeur contrasts death with birth, which opens ethic perspectives of historical existence: we are born every time during creative renewal. What is the role of the "death" question in this quarrel concerning competitive regions of ethics and ontology, of the beginning and the end?