Elmer M. Rasmussen Et Al. v. Helen E. Sgritta Et Al. Elmer M. Rasmussen Et Al. v. Helen E. Sgritta Et Al.

Elmer M. Rasmussen Et Al. v. Helen E. Sgritta Et Al‪.‬

NY.43933; 305 N.Y.S.2d 816; 33 A.D.2d 843 (1969)

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Publisher Description

The litigants are adjacent property owners on Seventh Avenue in the City of Troy. While the actual boundary line between the
properties was 13 1/2 inches to the south of plaintiff's house, over 66 years ago a stoop and sidewalk were constructed, the
stoop extending for another 13 1/2 inches on to defendants' property and the sidewalk consuming an additional 28 1/2 inches
wide and 80 feet 2 1/2 inches long. In October of 1959 the defendants erected a fence which prevented ingress and egress by
means of the sidewalk and stoop and the plaintiffs forthwith brought the instant action alleging two causes of action; one
based on adverse possession, and the other on an easement by prescription. A prescriptive easement has been found, and we
see no reason advanced to disturb this determination. The principles of adverse possession and prescription are well settled
(e.g., Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N. Y. 296; Doherty v. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646; Bresler v. Brunt, 14 A.D.2d 650), and the instant
case presents only questions of fact which depend upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weighing of conflicting testimony.
And this is so even as to the element of continuity of possession and particularly the question of "tacking". New York does
not require that the subject property be expressly described in a deed or other instrument of conveyance (Belotti v. Bickhardt,
supra ; Millious v. Board of Educ. of Newark Val. Cent. School, 13 Misc. 2d 944). All that is required is privity between
the claimants and their predecessors and this may be shown by deed, parol, or otherwise (Lewis v. Indones, 280 App. Div. 980).
In our opinion the trial court on the evidence in the instant record could find that the plaintiffs or their predecessors
openly and notoriously, hostilely, exclusively, continuously and uninterruptedly used the property in question for more than
the necessary period to spell out a prescriptive easement. We cannot, however, find that the trial court was required to find
that plaintiffs established a claim of ownership by adverse possession as opposed to a prescriptive easement. While adverse
possession and an easement by prescription depend upon the same elements (Di Leo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 304 N. Y. 505),
they differ fundamentally in that one is based on a claim of possession and the other on a claim of use (Scallon v. Manhattan
Ry. Co., 185 N. Y. 359). The instant stoop and sidewalk were put in when both properties were owned by a common owner, and
the trial court could find that while the plaintiffs' and their predecessors' activities with respect thereto were sufficient
to give notice of a claim of use, they were not on the instant record sufficient to give notice of a claim of possession. Disposition Judgment affirmed, without costs.

GENRE
Professional & Technical
RELEASED
1969
11 December
LANGUAGE
EN
English
LENGTH
2
Pages
PUBLISHER
LawApp Publishers
SIZE
67.8
KB

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