Rogers v. State

On February 17, 1945, for a consideration of $469.50, W. W. Barron Jr. conveyed to J. J. Barron a described lot of land in Jones County, Georgia, containing 20 1/2 acres. By that deed the grantor reserved a right to redeem the conveyed premises at any time within two years from the date of his deed by repaying the purchase money, with interest at the legal rate. His deed was duly recorded March 18, 1946. On April 10, 1946, and for a recited consideration of $10 and other valuable considerations, W. W. Barron Jr. conveyed the same land to Guy L. Anderson and J. Pierce Anderson. That deed recites: "By virtue of the privilege of redemption within two years from February 17, 1945, this being the date I deeded to said J. J. Barron the above described property, I have this day tendered to J. J. Barron the principal sum of $469.50 and the sum of $38.40 interest, this being the legal rate of interest as contracted for, this sum being tendered to him in U.S. currency and at the same time a quit-claim deed was presented to him to sign conveying the above described property back to me, W. W. Barron Jr., and the said J. J. Barron fails and refuses to convey this property to me according to agreement in the deed I gave him; now, I am selling and conveying to parties of the second part the above described land, and conveying to them, for a valuable consideration, all right, title, interest, and privilege that I may have by law or equity towards redeeming this property for themselves, their heirs and assigns as against the said J. J. Barron, his heirs and assigns. Party of the first part also tendered to J. J. Barron all taxes paid on said property by him." As such grantees, the two Andersons brought an equitable suit against J. J. Barron in the Superior Court of Jones County on September 30, 1946, and prayed that he be required to specifically perform his contract with respect to said land, and that he be required to convey the subject land to them by quitclaim deed. The allegations of their petition need not be set out here, since they are fully reported in a former appearance of this litigation in Barron v. Anderson, 204 Ga. 7 (48 S.E.2d 846), where it was held that their petition stated a cause of action for specific performance. The defendant, by his answer, denied the allegations of the petition, and by amendment averred that, after the execution and delivery of the deed containing the redemption agreement, W. W. Barron Jr., in consideration of other and further payments of money to him by the defendant, agreed that the provision for redemption would not be insisted upon and that the defendant should and would have complete and absolute title to the land. The case then proceeded to trial and the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendants motion for a new trial was subsequently overruled, and in Barron v. Anderson, 205 Ga. 487 (53 S.E.2d 682), this court reversed that judgment, holding that the trial Judge erred on the trial in excluding certain evidence which the defendant offered in support of his amendment.