Lillbask v. State of Connecticut Department of Education

Argued: October 28, 2003 Plaintiff-appellant, Ingabritt Lillbask, the legal guardian of Lindsey Mauclaire, a disabled child, sued defendants-appellees, the Connecticut Department of Education, Commissioner Theodore S. Sergi, the Connecticut Board of Education, Hearing Officer Mary Gelfman, the Redding Board of Education, and Redding School Superintendent Kenneth Freeston (hereinafter ""defendants""), for violations of both the United States and Connecticut Constitutions as well as various federal and state statutes, notably the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (""IDEA""), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1490 (2000)1 ; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701--796l (2000); and Connecticut's special education law, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-76a--10-76gg (2003). Lillbask now appeals from a final judgment entered in defendants' favor on February 13, 2003, in the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge). The judgment followed a bench trial, after which the district court issued a detailed unpublished Memorandum of Decision concluding that plaintiff had failed to carry her burden on the claim of retaliation in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The district court had previously issued two published decisions resolving cross-motions for summary judgment on all other claims in favor of defendants. See Lillbask v. Sergi, 193 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D. Conn. 2002); Lillbask v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Conn. 2000). On this appeal, Lillbask challenges certain rulings made by the district court on summary judgment. Specifically, she faults the court for (1) rejecting as a matter of law her IDEA challenge to defendants' proposal to place Lindsey in a private special education facility for the 1997-1998 school year,2 (2) holding that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1) was neither inconsistent with nor preempted by IDEA, and (3) rejecting as a matter of law her procedural challenges to administrative proceedings relating to Lindsey's placement. Defendants counter that Lillbask's first and second points are moot and that her third lacks merit. We agree with defendants that Lillbask's challenges to (1) the proposed 1997-1998 placement for Lindsey and (2) the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76h(a)(1) no longer present live controversies. With respect to her challenges to administrative proceedings before individual hearing officers, we affirm the district court's judgment with respect to the proceedings before the third hearing officer, but we reverse with respect to the proceedings before the second hearing officer, defendant Gelfman.