Back Channel to Cuba
The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana
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- USD 19.99
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- USD 19.99
Descripción editorial
History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations. Now in paperback and updated to tell the real story behind the stunning December 17, 2014, announcement by President Obama and President Castro of their move to restore full diplomatic relations, this powerful book is essential to understanding ongoing efforts toward normalization in a new era of engagement. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual conflict and aggression between the United States and Cuba since 1959, Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh here present a remarkably new and relevant account, describing how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. They reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, that provides the historical foundation for the dramatic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba ties.
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
For more than 50 years, the U.S. and Cuba have endured a tempestuous relationship fraught with the Cold War tensions that followed Fidel Castro's rise to power, the subsequent U.S. embargo, the Bay of Pigs debacle, and the Cuban missile crisis. LeoGrande, an American University government professor, and Kornbluh, a researcher at the National Security Archive, dug into classified and declassified records to chart the myriad attempts of presidents, from Eisenhower to Obama, to normalize American relations with Cuba. Through both official channels and secret dialogues, third-party nations such as Brazil, Mexico, and Spain served as intermediaries between U.S. presidents and Cuban officials. Jimmy Carter came closest to a wary modus vivendi with the formidable Castro, but his State Department and National Security Council advisers worked at cross-proposes, leaving Carter to carry on his grand but futile project into retirement. Even the Soviet Union's collapse did not translate into better ties as evidenced by the willingness of Reagan's secretary of state, Alexander Haig, to turn Cuba "into a parking lot." Despite good intentions, Barack Obama has scarcely fared better than his predecessors. Told in clear prose, this richly detailed book underscores how diplomacy makes headlines, but many exchanges happen far from official negotiation tables.
