Attacking the Mobile Ballistic Missile Threat in the Post-Cold War Environment: New Rules to an Old Game, WMD, Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Weapons, V-2 History, Korolev, von Braun, Crossbow

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This study will examine how technology and doctrine have responded to the mobile ballistic missile threat over time. As this work reviews the changes that occurred over the last 60 years, it will seek to highlight the differences in context between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. To achieve this goal, current studies by the government and independent research agencies, as well as those done in academic circles were consulted. Additionally, this thesis explores the application of military technology and decision-making structures over the past several decades. News articles, recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) historical documents, and other government surveys were also tapped. Personal interviews with former Soviet missile design engineer, Dr. Sergei Khrushchev, and vice commander of Air Combat Command, Lt Gen Bruce Wright, were also central to this work. Efforts made by allied governments will not be specifically addressed other than to underscore the added complexity in decision making that is endemic to coalition operations.

Chapter 2 begins the analysis by outlining the evolution of the mobile ballistic missile from its genesis in World War II through the height of the Cold War. Specifically, it concentrates on the reasons why certain nations deploy these deadly weapons. The chapter ends by foreshadowing the dramatic increase in the global mobile ballistic missile threat caused by proliferation among Third World nations and rising world powers (such as China) after the decline of the Soviet Union.

In chapter 3, the study shifts gears to address America's technological and doctrinal stance against the Soviet mobile ballistic missile threat during the Cold War. From blind guesswork and extrapolation on the part of the US intelligence community at the start of the Cold War, to the unveiling of a sophisticated collection capability that is still in place today, the change in US posture as it related to the Soviet mobile missile threat holds some lessons as we confront a new and very dangerous kind of mobile missile threat.

In chapter 4, against the backdrop of a "new world order," the study will describe the current status of the American counterforce (specifically pre-launch) battle against mobile ballistic missiles. New strategies and concepts such as preemption and "time-sensitive targeting" are addressed. Likewise, the chapter studies some of the weapon systems and technologies that will turn these concepts into reality. The primary intent of chapter 4 is to illustrate the ways in which American forces have reequipped themselves and redefined strategy to combat mobile ballistic missiles in the post-Cold War environment. Ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) ballistic missiles are growing consistently over time and have the potential to make the post-Cold War era the most dangerous in American history.

Finally, chapter 5 offers practical recommendations to improve America's ability to counter the deadly threat posed by mobile ballistic missiles over the next several decades. All recommendations stress the need to think differently than we did during the Cold War. While many of the Cold War's concepts and practices retain some relevance, the rules of the game have changed.