Madison's Missing Branch

The role of the U.S. government in regulating economic and social interactions has grown exponentially since the establishment of "Madisonian democracy" in 1788. This has undermined one of the Founders' tacit assumptions—that the federal government's role would be small. Further, Madison's theory that central government would reduce political corruption has been falsified by experience.

Today the three-branch structure is inadequate to control vastly increased opportunities for private interests to influence policy. The power of private interests is unbalanced; easily organized influencers have far more weight than large, poorly organized interests. The result is policies that promote inequality. In addition, legislators and administrators rely on interest group information and resources in making policy decisions. There is little incentive for policymakers to consider their impact on the "general welfare," however measured.

Moreover, there is little effective quality control of federal policies. The standard remedy for these imperfections is the regulation of campaign financing and lobbying. Unfortunately, the First Amendment constrains such regulation. I propose the creation, within the Madisonian framework, of a genuinely independent fourth branch with the power to veto policies that reduce aggregate welfare and equality of means.