The policy question is clear: state laws that ban out-of-state direct shipping of wine but permit in-state wineries to ship directly hurt consumers and provide little to no off-setting public benefits, such as promoting temperance. (1) The legal question, however, is more opaque. For any other product, such discriminatory laws would be forbidden by the dormant commerce clause, but the issue of whether a state can discriminate in favor of in-state liquor sellers remains unsettled because, as Judge Easterbrook has noted, a state can "control alcohol in ways that it cannot control cheese." (2) The reason for this difference--and hence legal uncertainty--is the confusingly written and frequently misunderstood [section] 2 of the 21st Amendment. (3) As the Supreme Court again will be faced with interpreting [section] 2, an analysis of the clause's original meaning is timely. (4) This note will argue that, as originally intended, [section] 2 did not permit discrimination. An examination of the legal and legislative landscape that existed behind the ratification of the 21st Amendment demonstrates that while [section] 2 carved out for the States an expanded "police power zone," (5) it did not repeal the anti-discrimination principle. This is true despite the proposed deletion of [section] 3. In fact, the removal of [section] 3 reinforces this view.