The Primacy of Space in Heidegger and Taylor: Towards a Unified Account of Personal Identity (Martin Heidegger and Charles Taylor) (Critical Essay‪)‬

1. Introduction In this paper I do not propose a definition of personal identity. Rather, I explore the transcendental conditions that are required for the question of personal identity to emerge as a meaningful one. I contend that a more complete answer to the question of personal identity must answer not only who we are but what kind of beings we are. And if we want to know who and what we are, then we need to look, at least initially, into the space where we stand and that we move in. I argue that because Charles Taylor and Martin Heidegger are two philosophers that give the notion of space a prominent role, it will follow that they are in the best position to articulate what it means to be a being that lives on this earth and that attempts to forge an identify for itself. For them the question of personal identity cannot be answered by mere introspection. I argue that there is a fundamental ontological agreement between Heidegger and Taylor. This agreement lies in that, for both philosophers, the question of human identity cannot be answered by mere introspection. The identity of the self is not discoverable by looking inward--as Descartes would have us do. If we want to know what and who we are, then we need to look, at least initially, outside of us into the space (or more specifically, the spaces) where we stand and that we move in and occupy.