The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge
comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods,
depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions,
sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is
not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic
authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual
necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts.
This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the
epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as
inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as
transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as
expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative
“pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the
phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and
intriguing philosophical challenges.