A Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) "The Many Phenomenological Reductions‪"‬

Mark K. Spencer publishes an article in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (volume XX, 2021). The full title is "The Many Phenomenological Reductions and Catholic Metaphysical Anti-Reductionism".
There are as many types of phenomenology as phenomenologists. Or, so it seems. But, according to Spencer, they have one feature in common. They all follow Husserl in attempting to experience the noumenon, the thing itself. In doing so, they swim against the tide of science. Scientists focus on phenomena. Phenomena are observed, measured, modeled and discussed in disciplinary conferences.
I find it odd that Husserl names his inquiry after phenomena, not their noumenon. Also, phenomenological reductionism is not quite the same as scientific reductionism.
Scientific reductionism says, "Look at only the observable and measurable aspects of the thing itself. Build models. Publish these models using specialized disciplinary language. The thing reduces to its models."
Phenomenological reductionism says, "Reduction involves bracketing out all judgments, especially the scientific empirio-schematic judgment. The thing itself may then be directly and intuitively grasped."
Phenomenology is anti-reductionist when it comes to science.
So is Christian metaphysics.
What does this imply?
Spencer proposes an alliance. He discusses the history of phenomenology, how phenomenology and metaphysics challenge one another, and how they might value each other.
What he does not mention is the foil. Both phenomenology and Christian metaphysics compete in their desire to situate the Positivist's judgment, where a positivist intellect holds together the noumenon, its phenomena and the empirio-schematic judgment.
Spencer does not mention science.
This lacunae has implications. My comments sound a series of reveries. Wake up and smell the coffee. Imagine what phenomenology and metaphysics have in store for one another.